What Next in Iran? Are the Consequences of Dropping Bombs Understood?

U.S. intelligence is great at information-gathering, but what about assessing the impact?

When U.S. Sen. Dave Durenberger chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee, he often said that the U.S. intelligence agencies were the best in the world in discovering what was going on around the world. Where they sometimes fell short was in assessing the likely consequences of the events and actions the intelligence network uncovered.

An example cited by Durenberger is Iran. In the 1970s, the U.S. saw the religious fanaticism that was taking root in the country. Intelligence analysts, though, were slow to recognize how the fervor would overthrow the Shah of Iran and replace him with a theocracy that was hostile to the U.S.

Those thoughts come to mind in the aftermath of the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities. When Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified to Congress in March that Iran was years away from weaponizing its enriched uranium, there are good reasons to accept the validity of her testimony. U.S. intelligence agencies have shown they remain the best in the world at collecting critical information. Their findings are supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the organization charged with monitoring Iran’s nuclear capabilities under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the international treaty from which President Trump withdrew the U.S. in 2018. And, before Trump advocates jump in with skepticism about IAEA, recall that this same agency is the one the president tasked with monitoring the new treaty he hoped to conclude with Iran.

Israel reached a different conclusion. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran was imminent. But Netanyahu has been sounding the same alarm for decades. As a member of the Knesset he said in 1992, “Within three to five years, we can assume that Iran will become autonomous in its ability to develop and produce a nuclear bomb.” In 2002, he urged the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., telling a congressional committee that both Iran and Iraq were developing weapons of mass destruction. Not only were no weapons of mass destruction found, there was little evidence supporting Netanyahu’s claim of a race to develop them.

None of this is to suggest that Iran doesn’t want nuclear weapons or that its enrichment of uranium isn’t extremely worrisome. It is to suggest, though, the evidence of an imminent nuclear threat is weak.

If true and Iran, as Gabbard told Congress, is years away from having a nuclear weapon, what are the consequences of a U.S. attack? One hopes that even if President Trump ignored the findings of U.S. intelligence on Iran’s capabilities, he had a fact-based understanding of the consequences of an attack.

On one side of the equation are positive outcomes. The bombing may force Iran to protect what remains of a regime already staggering politically and economically and turn inwards.

Netanyahu has gone several steps farther, openly advocating for the death of the Supreme Leader of Iran and regime change that would result in a less threatening Iran. That would be good news for the region and the entire world. Iran has been a primary funder of terrorist militias in the Mideast and has been an exporter of weapons and technology to Russia in support of its war with Ukraine.

Perhaps the damage the bombing has inflicted on Iran gives broader latitude for Trump and more urgency for Iran to conclude a treaty with stricter limitations and closer monitoring of nuclear activities. A damaged Iran struggling just to sustain its regime may even be the opening Trump needs to expand the Abraham Accords, his first-term effort to achieve stability in the region. With reduced fear of Iran fomenting terrorism, perhaps other countries will join in negotiating peaceful coexistence with Israel and a long-term solution to the Palestinian crisis. It also could be the window of opportunity for the U.S. and regional allies to stabilize Syria now that the brutal Bashar al-Assad has been exiled.

Perhaps some or all of these consequences will come to pass. Perhaps not. Even Israel acknowledges that its air strikes have not eliminated Iran’s inventory of short-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching American military bases and other assets throughout the region. Retaliation at a significant scale certainly remains a possibility. And if Iran chooses this course, what then? Does the U.S. launch more waves of attacks, targeting more non-nuclear facilities and risking - or even planning - collateral damage to Iran’s civilian infrastructure?

The attacks could unleash a new wave of religious extremism and anti-American sentiment resulting in attacks against the U.S. not just in the Mideast but in other parts of the world or even on domestic soil. We know all too well it has happened before.

The alliance between Israel and the U.S. in attacking Iran may further damage America’s standing in the global community as world opinion increasingly turns against Israel for its unrelenting and often-brutal war with Palestine. This could embolden some adversaries to leverage Iran’s desire for revenge by using it as a proxy to damage U.S. interests. Russia’s Vladimir Putin already has denounced the bombing and opened the door to a meeting with Iran.

Then there are the experts who believe the first wave of bombs left some of Iran’s nuclear facilities repairable or some hidden operations or uranium stockpiles untouched. What if Netanyahu was right when he claimed Iran actually had started to build a nuclear weapon? If the bombs missed that operation or failed to destroy it, Iran today quite likely is putting all its resources into accelerating that effort. And, if Netanyahu was wrong, but the bombs left key operations intact, certainly the political support within Iran for rushing to weaponize the enriched uranium that may have been lacking before is strengthened now.

It seems Durenberger’s implicit question of 40 years ago remains the relevant one today. If the U.S. accurately assessed what is happening in Iran, did Trump have the right information to evaluate the consequences of his actions? What is the clear goal of the U.S. in conducting its bombing?

In short, the first wave of bombing is over. The questions remain the day after the bombing the same as the day before: What now and do we trust our transactional President to have an answer?